April 26, 2024

Federal Reserve Super Low Rate Policy Crushes Savers And The Elderly

Fed Sees Solution In Zero Rates

The Federal Reserve recently vowed to keep interest rates “exceptionally low”  for the foreseeable future in an attempt to revive the economy.   Since mid 2006 the Fed has brought the Fed Funds Rate down from 5% to virtually zero in an attempt to reduce the debt service burden on over leveraged borrowers.

fredgraph

A world of ultra low interest rates may continue for much longer than many expect.

Fed To Keep Rates Low  (WSJ) –  Fed officials voted unanimously to maintain their target for the key federal-funds interest rate — at which banks lend to each other overnight — near zero and said they expect to keep it there for an “extended period,” which suggested increases are at least several months off.

While consumers are spending, the Fed noted they were “constrained by ongoing job losses, sluggish income growth, lower housing wealth and tight credit.” Meanwhile, “businesses are still cutting back on fixed investment and staffing, though at a slower pace.”

A low interest rate policy has worked in the past to stimulate the economy and the Fed is applying the same prescription to the current economic downturn.   At this point, it is too early to tell if the same policies of super low rates and easy money will work as it has in the past.  Japan stands out as the premier example of a post bubble economy still failing to recover despite twenty years of super easy fiscal and monetary policies.  The Fed prescription of attempting to revive an overly indebted economy with more lending may very well produce the same results as in Japan – slow economic growth, lower incomes and crushing public debt burdens.

Individuals who were prudent enough to save and avoid debt are now left to  wonder if they will ever see a return on their savings.  Short term CD’s are below 1%, money market funds pay a ridiculously low rate barely above zero and short term treasuries have a negative yield.   Those who are retired and depend on interest income for living expenses must now deplete their savings or take on more risk by investing in higher yielding bond funds subject to substantial market fluctuations.

The Fed’s low interest rate policy effectively represents a massive wealth transfer from savers to debtors.   FDIC insured deposits of bank savings and CDs currently total $4.8 trillion and there is approximately $5 trillion in money market funds for a total of $10 trillion that is earning at best 1% compared to 5% in 2006.  The drop in interest rates from 5% to 1% represents an annual income loss to savers of $400 billion dollars per year.

Congress and the Fed have attempted to bailout out every imprudent debtor  with super low interest rates – homeowners who borrowed too much, bankers who lent foolishly, and hundreds of poorly run, over indebted companies from GM to AIG.   Someone always pays in the end and in this case, the victims are the savers.

More On This Topic

Near-Zero Rates Are Hurting The Economy

The Correlation Between Incomes And Default Rates

The Marginalization Of Risk

The massive number of loan defaults that has put the entire banking industry on the brink on insolvency did not happen by accident.   Banks recklessly extended credit, even to low income borrowers who obviously had the least ability to service their debts.   What may have seemed like a virtuous circle of increased consumer consumption and  higher banking profits has turned into a debt disaster for both borrower and lender – consider the Democratization of Credit.

WSJ -The recession has forced a financial reckoning for Americans across the income spectrum. The pressure is especially acute for the low-income Americans who relied on borrowing for daily expenses or to gain the trappings of middle-class life. Shifting credit practices over several decades had enabled them to live beyond their means by borrowing nearly as readily as the more affluent.

But the financial crisis and recession have reversed what some economists dubbed the “democratization of credit,” forcing a tough adjustment on both low-income families and the businesses that serve them.

“We saw an extension of credit to a much deeper socioeconomic level, and they got access to the same credit instruments as middle-class and mainstream Americans,”…

The financial crisis has forced lenders to be especially cautious with the riskiest borrowers, a category that low-income families often fall into because their debt tends to be higher relative to income and assets.

Some are turning to wherever they can for credit. A publicly traded pawnshop chain, EZCorp., reported a 37% rise in revenue in the second quarter. “With credit limited and other options disappearing, there are people looking for somewhere they can get emergency cash,” said David Crume, president of the National Pawnbrokers Association.

Cash-strapped workers have long obtained advances through “payday loans,” available at storefront lenders for fees that equate to high annual interest rates. Even that move is not so easy now.

“More customers are walking in the door, but turndowns are up,” said Steven Schlein, a spokesman for the payday-loan industry’s trade group, the Community Financial Services Association of America.

The Journal article also includes a chart showing that the combined delinquency and default rate for lower income groups dramatically exceeds that of higher income groups.  Are lower income groups inherently a poorer credit risk or did lenders create the conditions for default by recklessly granting credit in excess of a borrower’s ability to repay?

The Journal article perhaps should have more appropriately been titled “the marginalization of risk”.   Banks failed miserably in executing their basic mission – lending prudently based on a borrower’s ability to service the debt.   Regulators failed miserably by allowing banks to make inherently unsound loans.  Did the bankers really believe the income numbers supplied by borrowers who “stated” their income?  What were the regulators thinking when they allowed banks to lend money without considering a borrower’s income, such as with “no doc” loans?

The long term adverse economic consequences of reckless lending are now obvious – the bigger tragedy is that it was allowed to happen in the first place.

FDIC Considers Borrowing From Treasury As Banking Failures Increase

FDIC May Request Treasury Loan As Losses Grow

The FDIC always takes pride in noting that it is self funding and covers failed bank losses by assessments on FDIC insured member financial institutions.

Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to restore public confidence in the nation’s banking system. The FDIC insures deposits at the nation’s 8,195 banks and savings associations and it promotes the safety and soundness of these institutions by identifying, monitoring and addressing risks to which they are exposed. The FDIC receives no federal tax dollars – insured financial institutions fund its operations.

How much longer the FDIC can continue to fund itself based on fee assessments is questionable.  For the second quarter of 2009, the banking industry as a whole lost $3.7 billion dollars and second quarter FDIC assessments totaled $9.1 billion.

FDIC Insurance Fund Nearly Depleted

The FDIC did borrow money from the Treasury during the last banking crisis in the early 1990’s and later paid the money back.  The escalating number of costly bank failures over the last two years has reduced the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) to only $10.4 billion which  covers potential losses on almost $5 trillion dollars in FDIC insured deposits.  In addition, the number of banks on the FDIC Problem Bank List continues to expand.

The Problem Bank List grew to to 416 institutions from 305 last quarter.  The total assets at Problem Banks increased to $299.8 billion from $220 billion last quarter.  This is the largest number of problem banks since June 30, 1994.  The number of FDIC  insured institutions declined to 8,195 from 8,247 last quarter.

Earlier this year the FDIC’s line of credit at the Treasury was increased to $100 billion and up to $500 billion with the consent of both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury.  With a nearly depleted  DIF fund and the prospect of hundreds of additional banking failures, the FDIC may have no choice but to borrow from the Treasury as noted in the Wall Street Journal.

WASHINGTON –– Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair said Friday her agency may tap its $500 billion credit line with the U.S. Treasury to replenish its deposit insurance fund, though she appeared cautious about doing so.

“We are carefully considering all options” including borrowing from the Treasury, Ms. Bair said Friday after a speech in Washington.

Ms. Bair has already warned banks that they may face an assessment increase to bolster the fund. Friday, she said there are also other little-known options available to the agency, including requiring banks to prepay assessments. The FDIC board of directors will meet at the end of this month to consider how to replenish the fund, she said.

Ms. Bair appeared cautious about resorting to the Treasury credit line, saying there are different views on when it should be used. She said some believe it should be reserved for emergencies only, rather than for covering losses that are already known.

Surging loan defaults show no sign of leveling off which in turn puts more banks at risk of failing.  The FDIC will need a Treasury bailout – the only question is will $500 billion be enough?

Noncurrent Loan Growth

Noncurrent Loan Growth

Feds Finally Move To Restrict Excessive Bank Compensation And Risk

Bailout Funds Go To Bank Bonuses

Banks that lost billions of dollars on speculative  investments and poor loans have routinely been awarding thousands of employees massive bonus payments.  Ironically, the only reason many of these banks are still in business and able to pay bonuses is due to the fact that they were bailed out by the taxpayers via the TARP program.

It is difficult to understand the lack of sensitivity exhibited by the bank’s compensation committees considering the populist outrage and criticism by politicians from both parties.  Consider Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts:

Nine of the financial firms that were among the largest recipients of federal bailout money paid about 5,000 of their traders and bankers bonuses of more than $1 million apiece for 2008, according to a report released Thursday by Andrew M. Cuomo, the New York attorney general.

All told, the bonus pools at the nine banks that received bailout money was $32.6 billion, while those banks lost $81 billion.

Some compensation experts questioned whether the bonuses should have been paid at all while the banks were receiving government aid.

“There are some real ethical questions given the bailouts and the precariousness of so many of these financial institutions,” said Jesse M. Brill, an outspoken pay critic who is the chairman of CompensationStandards.com, a research firm in California. “It’s troublesome that the old ways are so ingrained that it is very hard for them to shed them.”

Private firms that risk private capital on high risk leveraged investments should be free to compensate themselves as they see fit.  Banks, on the other hand, have been playing a “heads I win, tails you lose” game, risking depositor money (guaranteed against loss by the FDIC), suffering no consequences for bad decisions and collecting lavish bonuses for horrendous results.  The issue of why banks are allowed to risk taxpayer money on speculative activities was recently raised by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker – Volcker Seeks Bank Limits.

In his speech, Volcker urged limits on the activities of banks that are considered “too big to fail,” going beyond what other officials in the Obama administration have advocated.

“I do not think it reasonable that public money –taxpayer money — be indirectly available to support risk-prone capital market activities simply because they are housed within a commercial banking organization,” Volcker said.

“Extensive participation in the impersonal, transaction- oriented capital market does not seem to me an intrinsic part of commercial banking,” Volcker said. “Substantial involvement in heavily leveraged finance and heavy proprietary trading almost inevitably entails risks.”

“I want to question any presumption that the federal safety net, and financial support, will be extended beyond the traditional commercial banking community,” he said.

Paul Volcker was probably not the only one wondering why banks are operating outside traditional banking areas and risking taxpayer funds.  Volcker’s speech seemed to hint that regulators were belatedly preparing to restrict both bonus payments and unwarranted risk taking by the banking industry.  Following up on Volcker’s comments, the Federal Reserve today  proposed dramatic restrictions on both bonuses and risky investment activity by financial institutions.

Wall Street Journal – Policies that set the pay for tens of thousands of bank employees nationwide would require approval from the Federal Reserve as part of a far-reaching proposal to rein in risk-taking at financial institutions.

Under the proposal, the Fed could reject any compensation policies it believes encourage bank employees — from chief executives, to traders, to loan officers — to take too much risk.

The U.S.’s largest banks, about 25 in number, would get especially close scrutiny. The central bank intends to compare these banks as a group to see if any practices stand out as unusually dangerous to their firms.

The Fed itself believes it has the legal authority to take such action through its existing supervisory powers, which are designed to oversee a bank’s soundness.

Pay is now seen as a factor that could make a firm, and more broadly the financial system as a whole, vulnerable to collapse. The financial crisis turned up many examples of how pay can give employees incentives to take risks. One example: loan officers who churned out thousands of low-quality loans in order to claim annual bonuses for themselves.

In a Wednesday speech, Former Fed Chairman Paul A. Volcker noted that one of the causes of the financial crisis “was the ultimately explosive combination of compensation practices that provided enormous incentives to take risks” just as new financial innovations “seemed to offer assurance — falsely, as it has turned out — that those risks had been diffused.”

The policies would apply to banks regulated by the Fed, not savings-and-loans or state banks that are overseen by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

Will Fed Proposals Prevent The Next Banking Crisis?

If the Fed believed it had the legal authority to restrict undue risky activity at financial institutions, the obvious questions is why were these rules not implemented before the banking system imploded?  Regulators constantly reacting to disasters after they occur does not instill a strong sense of confidence that new regulations will prevent the next crisis.

Long Overdue Mortgage Regulations To Curb Lending Abuses

Feds React To Mortgage Lending Fiasco

In a move that can only be described as better late than never, various new Federal laws that restrict certain lending practices become effective on or after October 1, 2009.  Other regulations that mandate improved disclosures and early disclosures of loan costs and terms became effective on July 30, 2009.    Additional HUD regulations requiring the use of a standardized good faith estimate form and HUD-1 settlement statement will become law effective January 1, 2010.

The intention of the new regulations is to protect the consumer from unfair  and abusive lending practices and to ensure that the mortgage borrower is provided the necessary information to fully understand the costs and terms of a loan.  In general, the rules are a positive for both borrowers and lenders but are likely to add considerably to the time it takes to close on a mortgage loan.

If these lending regulations had been in effect during the late great mortgage mania boom of the early part of this decade, it is very likely that the current foreclosure and banking crises would have been a far less serious adverse economic event.   Borrowers would have been prevented from borrowing money that couldn’t be repaid and lenders would have been forced to make more intelligent underwriting decisions.

Lending Prohibitions Effective October 1, 2009 – Federal Reserve Board

  1. Mortgage lenders and brokers are prohibited from coercing or encouraging real estate appraisers to misrepresent the value of a home.   Per Glenn Gimble, FDIC Senior Policy Analyst, “That’s intended to ensure the integrity and accuracy of an appraisal, so that a consumer is not overpaying for a home or borrowing more money than the home is worth.
  2. Mortgage loan servicers must credit payments on the date received and must inform the borrower of an late-payment fees.
  3. For those applicants considered a subprime credit risk, a lender is prohibited from making a higher priced loan without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan from income or assets (other than the home’s value).  All income and assets used to qualify for loan approval must be verified.

Several points of interest on the new regulations.  Although there has been vociferous industry objections to the new appraisal restrictions under the Home Valuation Code of Conduct (HVCC), it is interesting to note that the HVCC rules do not apply to FHA mortgages.  Thus, for FHA loans, the lender or broker can still communicate directly with the appraiser and is also allowed to chose whatever appraiser is likely to “bring in” the highest value.

Self employed borrowers who have the income to make mortgage payments but who chose to evade taxes by not reporting their full income for tax purposes are going to have a very difficult time obtaining any type of mortgage financing.  Furthermore, tax evaders may chose to rent in the future, since the IRS is now matching mortgage payments to reported income to catch obvious tax evaders.

Wage earners without sufficient income will also be required to “borrow within their means”.  The only option now available for previous “stated income, no income” borrowers will be the local “unregulated” loan shark.

New Fed Rules On Costs And Terms Of Loan – Effective July 30, 2009

These new rules require earlier disclosures on purchases and refinances, a minimum waiting period of 7 days  between disclosure and closing, resending disclosures if the APR changes and restriction on charging any fees (except for a credit report) prior to receipt of loan disclosure documents.

New HUD rules effective January 1, 2010 require all brokers and lenders to use the same good faith estimate forms and a new uniform HUD-1 settlement statement.

Advertising Restrictions

Deceptive or misleading advertising regarding payments or teaser rates is prohibited.

Mortgage Loan Originators Subject To Federal Regulation

All loan officers at financial institutions and mortgage brokers will be required to register with the government and disclose information about their background and disciplinary history.  The information will be in a database available to consumers.  In addition, the law will require state governments to establish licensing and minimum educational requirements for loan originators.

The new background checks and educational requirements for loan originators is another long overdue reform.  During the height of the mortgage mania boom, it was common to see “loan originators” who should never have been allowed to work  in the mortgage industry.

Fly by night “mortgage companies” were hiring ex truck drivers, high school drop outs, ex waiters, etc. and putting them to work with little training or supervision.   Previously unemployable, uneducated individuals who would never have been hired anywhere else suddenly became “loan officers” during the mortgage boom.  Despite the low quality of applicants being hired by the mortgage industry, it was also common to hire loan originators without conducting basic financial or criminal background checks.

Too bad it took a major financial disaster before the Feds got around to figuring out that the mortgage industry was out of control.

The FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) – A Risky Game Of Confidence

FDIC Rightly Worries About Public Confidence

Due to the large number of bank failures during 2009 the FDIC Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) has fallen to the lowest level since March 1993.  Numerous headlines are screaming that the FDIC is bankrupt and that the DIF fund is depleted.  Considering the perilous financial condition of the banking industry and the possibility of perhaps another 1,000 or more bank closings, the FDIC is probably not capable of fulfilling its mission without substantial loans from the US Treasury.  (The last time this happened was in the early 1990s during the savings and loan crisis when the FDIC had to borrow $15 billion from the US Treasury.)  This does not mean, however, that the upcoming FDIC  Quarterly Banking Profile will report a negative balance in the DIF.

The FDIC has made it clear that they consider it important to maintain a positive DIF number to avoid causing a lack of confidence in the banking system by the public.

The FDIC believes that it is important that the fund not decline to a level that could undermine public confidence in federal deposit insurance. A fund balance and reserve ratio that are near zero or negative could create public confusion about the FDIC’s ability to move quickly to resolve problem institutions and protect insured depositors.

In addition, the FDIC has increased assessments on FDIC insured institutions to replenish the DIF fund and predicted that the DIF would remain positive in 2009.

May 22, 2009 – With the special assessment adopted today, the FDIC projects that the DIF will remain low but positive through 2009 and then begin to rise in 2010. However, Chairman Bair also cautioned that given the inherent uncertainty in these projections and the importance of maintaining a positive fund balance and reserve ratio, “it is probable that an additional special assessment will be necessary in the fourth quarter, although the amount of such a special assessment is uncertain.”

Even though the FDIC has significant authority to borrow from the Treasury to cover losses, a fund balance and reserve ratio that are near zero or negative could create public confusion about the FDIC’s ability to move quickly to resolve problem institutions and protect insured depositors.  The FDIC views the Treasury line of credit as available to cover unforeseen losses, not as a source of financing projected losses.

The DIF Shell Game

So how does the FDIC manage to report a positive DIF when the March 31, 2009 balance was $13 billion and estimated FDIC losses on bank closing since March 31 total $19.3 billion?  Determining the DIF balance is not a matter of simply subtracting the banking failure losses from the DIF fund.  The FDIC uses accrual accounting to establish reserves against the DIF fund for estimated future losses.

For example, during 2008 the FDIC heavily reserved for anticipated future banking failures in 2009.  The FDIC established provisions for losses of $41.8 billion compared to actual losses on 2008 bank closings of $17.9 billion.  The reserve fund at March 31 had a balance of $28.5 billion against which the FDIC year to date losses since March 31 of $19.3 billion could be charged.  This would still leave the FDIC a reserve balance for future banking failures of $9.2 billion.

In addition, the FDIC has imposed large assessment on FDIC insured banks to replenish the DIF fund.   The assessments earned by the FDIC have increased steadily throughout 2008 as the banking crisis unfolded.   In the first quarter of 2009, the FDIC collected assessments of $2.6 billion to rebuild the DIF fund.  This compares to total assessments for all of 2008 of $2.965 billion and only $643 million in 2007.

In summary, if the FDIC offsets its losses against previously established reserves,  and collects an additional $3 billion in assessments, the FDIC could actually report an increase in the DIF fund to approximately $16 billion.   My guess is that the FDIC will only use a portion of the reserve balance, and report a DIF positive balance in the range of $10 to $13 billion when the Quarterly Banking Profile is released.   It’s all about confidence and an uneducated stupid public – the DIF balance of around $20 billion allegedly “protects” over $6 trillion in deposits! The only thing that would expose this “confidence game” is if the financial results for the banking industry come in much worse than the last quarter.  Stay tuned.

DIF

DIF

Disclosures:  None

Geithner’s Pump And Dump Scheme

Pump and Dump

According to the SEC website, a pump and dump scheme is one of the most common investment frauds and works as follows:

First, there’s the glowing press release about a company, usually on its  financial health or some new product or innovation.  Then, newsletters that purport to offer unbiased recommendations may suddenly tout the company as the latest “hot” stock.  Messages in chat rooms and bulletin board postings may urge you to buy the stock quickly or to sell before the price goes down. Or you may even hear the company mentioned by a radio or TV analyst.

Unsuspecting investors then purchase the stock in droves, pumping up the price. But when the fraudsters behind the scheme sell their shares at the peak and stop hyping the stock, the price plummets, and innocent investors lose their money.

If all of this sounds familiar it should, since we have probably just witnessed one of the biggest pump and dump schemes ever perpetrated at the expense of witless bank share investors.

Consider the scenario: The Pump

Early this year, the financial system is in a panic as banks announce ever greater losses and talk of nationalizing the banking system is rampant.  Public officials fear a full blown banking collapse if worried depositors start a run on the banks.  Public opposition to bank bailouts is intense.

To stop the growing banking panic, the Fed and Treasury announce that the major banks are too large to fail and will not be allowed to collapse.

An easy to pass “stress test” of the biggest banks is announced to prove to the public that the banking industry is sound.

After a cursory examination of the largest banks, they all pass and are told to raise additional capital just to be on the safe side.

Investors start to buy the bank stocks en masse causing many bank stock shares to double and triple in price.

Over $200 billion in new capital is obtained from investors eager to get in at depressed prices.

Treasury Secretary Geithner states that “this transparent, conservatively designed test should result in a more efficient, stronger banking system”.

Witless commentators at CNBC pile on with predictions that the banks will soon be earning billions in profits.

No less a luminary than Warren Buffet adds to the buying panic by stating that he would put his entire net worth into Wells Fargo.

Potentially catastrophic losses on derivatives, commercial real estate, mortgages, off balance sheet assets and credit cards are swept under the rug as frenzied investors pile into a sure thing.

The Dump

Now, however, Geithner’s brilliant scheme seems to be entering the “dump” phase where “prices plummet and innocent investors lose their money”.  Consider the recent price action in major bank stocks:

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Most of the bank stocks peaked during May and have already declined substantially or appear to be in a distribution phase.  Nervous investors are considering the latest horrendous employment numbers and increasing defaults in virtually every major loan category.   There’s no harm in jumping into a pump and dump scheme early on for some quick gains.  It just might now be the time to jump back out.

Disclosures:  None

TARP 2 – Will Bad Loans Wipe Out Newly Raised Bank Capital?

Are The Banks Paying Back TARP Money Too Soon?

Since the beginning of the year, major banks have raised over $200 billion in capital, far in excess of the $75 billion of new capital that the government stress tests had called for.  The market prices of major bank stocks have recovered dramatically since March, indicating that Wall Street investors see a recovery in the banking industry.

In addition, the banking industry is enjoying one of the largest net interest margins in history due to a very low cost of funds.  Wells Fargo, for example, in the fourth quarter saw its average cost of funds decline to 1.5% while its net interest margin exceeded 4%.  With banks able to access cheap funding thanks to the super low rate money policy of the Federal Reserve, banks almost have a license to print money.

The big question is will the banks be able to earn enough to offset the huge amount of future write downs that will be needed on their troubled loans?  Earlier this year, Bloomberg reported that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated U.S. banking losses through 2010 at $1.06 trillion.  To date the banking industry has taken write downs of only half that amount, indicating further write downs of an additional $500 billion will be necessary.

In addition, delinquency rates on $1 trillion of commercial real estate loans held by banks have been increasing at a higher rate than anticipated.  Credit card losses for the banks have also been rapidly mounting from previous estimates.

Mortgage Default Surge Could Wipe Out Banking Capital

Total Estimated Losses

Total Estimated Losses

Courtesy:  T2 Partners LLC

The banking industry’s mortgage portfolio is the real wild card and may result in the need for huge additional write downs to cover the cost of mounting defaults.  The banking industry is facing a potential nightmare surge in mortgage loan defaults, even if real estate prices stabilize at current levels due to the large negative equity positions of many homeowners.  (The above chart shows the total estimated banking losses of which only a fraction has been realized to date.)

There is no historical model to predict the correlation of mortgage defaults to equity position, but one would expect that being deeply underwater on the mortgage will result in a strong economic motive to stop paying or simply walk away.  How many homeowners, for example, will continue to make a mortgage payment on a $200,000 mortgage when the home is valued at $100,000?  The greater the negative equity, the greater the odds of a mortgage default, especially if the homeowner is under financial stress.

Unfortunately, the problem of negative equity is not theoretical.  In the latest overview of housing and the credit crisis, T2 Partners LLC, has assembled an in depth excellently documented case on why the pain in housing is not about to end quickly.  One eye opener in the report is the estimate, by type of mortgage borrower, of negative equity.  T2 shows the following stats: 73% of OptionARMs, 50% of subprime , 45% of Alt A and 25% of prime mortgage loans are underwater.  Combine this with a weak economy, job losses and negative income growth and the potential for additional huge write downs on residential mortgages seems inevitable.

The impact of a poor economy and huge negative equity is already being reflected in default rates never experienced in modern economic history.  Almost 10% of all mortgages are in some stage of delinquency or default.  The delinquency rate on prime mortgages, never expected to exceed historical delinquency rates of approximately 1%, are now over 4.5%.  Note that prime mortgage loans are the loans that were never expected to have more than a minimal default rate based on the borrower’s credit and income characteristics.

The banking industry is likely to need every dollar of newly raised capital and then some to cover future loan losses.   If future banking industry profits are overwhelmed by additional loan losses, it will be years before banks can be solidly classified as well capitalized.   A capital constrained banking industry will survive in some form, but it may not be able to provide the new lending necessary to foster future economic growth

Banks Loss Reserves Can’t Keep Pace With Troubled Loans

The latest FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile reveals that banks increased loan loss reserves by 11.5% and the ratio of reserves to total loans increased to 2.5%, an all time high.   Despite the large loan loss reserves, the ratio of reserves to noncurrent loans fell for the 12th consecutive quarter to 66.5%, the lowest level in 17 years.   This low reserve ratio, despite large increases in loan loss provisions  indicates that the banking industry’s estimates of future delinquencies has consistently been too low.

Reserve Coverage Ratio

Reserve Coverage Ratio

Even if the amount of noncurrent loans level off, the implications for future banking profits is a dismal picture.   In order to establish an adequate coverage ratio for noncurrent loans, loan loss provisions will have to rise dramatically.

Prime Mortgage Defaults – Another Black Swan

The banking industry’s low estimate for loan delinquencies may be due in large part to the unexpectedly large increase in default rates seen on prime mortgages.   Prime mortgages were never expected to have a default rate above the historical ratio of around 1% since these were mortgage loans made to the best customers.  In the past, the only defaults typically seen on prime mortgages were due to unexpected job loss, a divorce, illness or other factors beyond the control of the borrower.

The rapid increase of delinquencies on prime mortgages  has caught the banks off guard.   The default rates on prime mortgages is now almost 5% (5 times normal),  a true Black Swan event for the banking industry.  In addition, the  default rate could rise even higher since 25% of prime mortgage holders now have negative equity, a situation which enhances the odds of  delinquency and defaults.

Based on the rapidly deteriorating numbers for prime mortgages, loan loss reserves need to be increased significantly.  The myth that most of the smaller community banks are not exposed to the risks that afflicted the bigger banks is only partially true.   Banks of all sizes have significant exposure to the mortgage market and the growing number of defaults  by prime mortgage borrowers will cause significantly higher than expected losses at all banks.

Prime Mortgage Delinquencies

Prime Mortgage Delinquencies

Courtesy of:  moremortgagemeltdown.com

Problem Banks, Failed Banks Increasing Rapidly

The 36 failed banks we have seen this year has expanded dramatically from 25 for all of 2008, but has remained very low considering the extent of the losses in the banking sector.  Many very weak banks have apparently been allowed to stay open under the misguided hope that mortgage defaults would decrease as the economy improved.  The number of banks classified by the FDIC as “Problem Banks” has risen to 305 from 90 last year.  The latest surge in mortgage defaults due to job losses,  declines in real estate  prices and negative income trends will have a devastating effect on an already weakened banking industry.

The FDIC’s line of credit with the Treasury was recently increased to $100 billion from $30 billion.  The FDIC can borrow up to $500 billion with Federal Reserve and Treasury Department approval.  Expect to see the FDIC draw down significantly on their expanded line of credit with the Treasury as the FDIC is forced to close increasing numbers of insolvent banking institutions.